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Abstract  
Building on Lazear’s skill weights approach, we study the effect of having more or less 
heterogeneity in the training curriculum on supply of and demand for apprenticeship 
training. Modernizations of training curricula provide us with a quasi-experimental setting as 
these modernizations can be seen as a relatively exogenous shock. We argue that firms will 
train more apprentices when they have more choice options in the training curriculum 
because of (1) the higher productivity of graduates who have acquired more skills that are 
relevant for the firm, and (2) firms’ higher market power in the wage bargaining process with 
graduates. We test this hypothesis on data on the supply of apprenticeship places in 
Germany in all occupations from 2004 to 2014. We find that a more heterogeneous 
curriculum increases both firms’ supply of and students’ demand for training places. 
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1. Introduction 
The dual apprenticeship system in Germany plays an important role in integrating 
young people into the labor market and in safeguarding a skilled workforce. More than 50% 
of each cohort starts an apprenticeship program each year (Uhly 2015). As firms can freely 
decide whether they provide training places or not, it is important to understand the 
incentives and conditions under which firms are willing to supply training places. The 
analysis of the supply of apprenticeship places has so far focused on demographic 
developments, the business cycle, and alternative recruitment possibilities on the external 
labor market (Troltsch & Walden 2010; Mühlemann et al. 2009; Dietrich & Gerner 2007; 
Maier & Walden 2014). However, none of these studies has related firms’ supply of training 
places to the content of the training curriculum.  
According to the German Vocational Training Act2, training firms have to impart a pre-
determined set of skills defined in a standardized curriculum when providing training places 
in a recognized occupation of the dual system. While some occupations allow for 
specialization opportunities in their training curriculum, apprenticeship training courses for 
other occupations are designed as “mono-occupations”, in which every firm has to teach 
exactly the same skills. However, due to technological and organizational developments, 
training curricula are sometimes modernized.3 A modernization of the training curriculum 
for a particular occupation often does not only change the content of the curriculum but also 
changes the choice options training firms have. Since the 1990s, for example, a tendency 
towards more heterogeneity in the training curricula could be seen (Demgenski & Icks 2003; 
Bretschneider & Schwarz 2011). In this paper, we use these relatively exogenous changes in 
the regulatory framework of apprenticeship training to assess the impact of having choice 
options on firms’ supply of apprenticeship places as well as on youngsters’ willingness to 
enroll in certain occupations within the dual apprenticeship system4.  
A more tailor-made training content enables firms to train their apprentices in a way 
which is more closely aligned to what the firm really needs. This will render the apprentice 
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 See §4(2) of German Vocational Training Act 
3 The initiative for curricula modernizations usually starts from professional associations, the central employer 
organization, unions or the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training. For more information about 
the development and process of training regulations see Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (2014b). 
4
 The exact year a new curriculum is implemented can be seen as relatively random. Moreover, by including 
year dummies and occupation-specific time trends, we can rule out a substantial amount of potential 
endogeneity. 
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more productive both during the training period and after completion of training, whereas 
training which is closer to the production process of the firm is less complicated to organize, 
something which could reduce training costs. Moreover, a more specialized curriculum 
increases the market power of the training firm because apprentices who have completed 
training can only apply their skills in fewer outside firms. As a result, firms are able to pay 
lower wages upon the retention of the trainees, something which increases their incentives 
to provide apprenticeship places. 
From the firms’ perspective, the positive aspects of having more choice options seem 
to be undisputed. The results of a firm survey conducted on behalf of the former German 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor in 2005 (Ramboll Management 2005) indicate that 
different aspects of the training curricula, such as content and structure, play a crucial role in 
a firm’s decision on whether or not to offer apprenticeship places. Indeed, 53% of all non-
training firms state that allowing for more freedom in the training organization would ease 
the initiation of training (Schönfeld et al. 2010)5. Demgenski & Icks (2003) also argue that too 
restrictive training curricula can be a severe obstacle to providing training. They show that 
54% of former training firms see the lack of specialization opportunities as a huge 
impediment to continuing to provide apprenticeship training. Having choice options in the 
curriculum is therefore likely to increase firms’ commitment to apprenticeship training.  
Apprentices, on the other hand, do not necessarily have the same interests as the 
firms that offer apprenticeships. More specialized training means that apprentices who have 
completed training have worse chances of finding a job in other firms because their skills 
then only match the skill demands of fewer other firms. If apprentices are not sure whether 
they will be retained upon completion of training, too specialized a curriculum may not be 
attractive for them. However, a more specialized training can also make the apprentice more 
productive in the training firm as the imparted skills correspond more closely to the firms’ 
skill needs in the production process. If the higher productivity is to some extent reflected in 
a higher wage, the introduction of more choice options for firms could also increase the 
attractiveness of training from the apprentice’s point of view.  
In this paper, we explain the development of the supply6 of and demand for 
apprenticeship places after the introduction of more or fewer choice options in the course of 
a modernization. Assuming that training costs do not increase, the number of firms 
providing apprenticeship training will increase in line with increasing post-training benefits.  
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 This question was only asked to firms that currently do not offer training places. 
6
 According to the wording of the data set, the term “supply” here refers to apprenticeship places and not to 
the supply of labor.  
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Using data on the supply of and demand for apprenticeship places in Germany for 271 
occupations over 11 years, we analyze the effect of curricula modernizations on training 
supply and demand empirically. The information about the modernization of the training 
curriculum is obtained by comparing the training curricula before and after modernizations. 
In total, 86 modernizations were analyzed. Our empirical analyses show that both supply of 
and demand for apprenticeships are positively affected by the introduction of more choice 
options in the training curriculum. This shows that leaving sufficient freedom in the training 
regulation improves the attractiveness of the dual system for firms as well as apprentices.  
Our study contributes to the human capital literature on training by analyzing the 
effect of curriculum heterogeneity on the supply of and demand for apprenticeship places. 
The heterogeneity of training curricula might be an important aspect of the firms’ willingness 
to train. This issue is highly relevant for designing (new) training regulations, within existing 
apprenticeship systems as well as for countries that aim to introduce elements of an 
apprenticeship system. Taking this knowledge into account can ensure the attractiveness of 
the apprenticeship system both from the firms’ and the students’ points of view. The 
insights provided in this paper can also be transferred to other centrally regulated or 
certified training courses.   
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the relevant 
literature that provides the theoretical background to our empirical analysis. Section 3 
presents the hypotheses on the effect of modernizations on the supply of training places and 
elaborates on the relation to the demand for training places. Section 4 discusses the data 
and explains how the degree of choice options of the curricula is ordered. Section 5 presents 
the empirical strategy to test the derived hypotheses and section 6 presents the results. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature  
While some firms train because they want to make use of the productive contribution 
of the apprentices, other firms decide to offer training places mainly because they want to 
retain the apprentices as skilled workers after the training period (Merrilees 1983). In the 
former case, firms actually do not bear any training costs as the productive contributions 
already compensate for the training expenses. In the latter case, firms regard the training 
costs as an investment, which they can recoup upon the retention of the apprentices. As 
rational firms only decide to train when expected benefits exceed expected costs, firms need 
to be able to pay a wage below skilled workers’ productivity in order to recoup their training 
costs. However, paying a wage below workers’ productivity is only possible when the firm 
has a certain market power over its employee. Becker (1962) showed that firms have no 
incentives to pay for training in general human capital. If firms then pay a wage below a 
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worker’s productivity after the training, the employee would leave the training firm and find 
a firm that offers a wage equal to his or her productivity. Firm-specific human capital, in 
contrast, can only be utilized in the training firm. Therefore, firms are only willing to invest in 
firm-specific human capital. Acemoglu & Pischke (1999b; 1999a), however, expand Becker’s 
theory by arguing that in non-competitive labor markets under the existence of wage 
compression, firms are also willing to pay for general human capital. Dionisius et al. (2009) 
showed that Germany is such a case, where the compressed wage structure leads to 
substantial post-training benefits, and in the same way to a willingness to incur training 
costs. As most occupations are associated with net training costs (see Schönfeld et al. 2010), 
one can expect post training benefits for most occupations7.  
Stevens (1994) identifies a third group of skills, which she terms as transferable skills. 
Although these skills can be deployed in more firms, and are thus, technically seen, general 
skills, the wage does not have to equal the productivity of the person who has completed 
training because of the low degree of competition for these skills. Occupation-specific skills 
are a clear example of such transferable skills. Occupation-specific human capital denotes a 
set of skills that are merely useful within one occupation. Wolter & Ryan (2011) explain that 
these occupation-specific skills create monopsony power for the training firm as they limit 
the number of potential outside firms where trained workers could employ their skills.8 As a 
result, workers’ productivity related to these occupational skills is not fully reflected in their 
wages. Also Bhaskar et al. (2002) argue that when employers have some market power, they 
may have an incentive to pay for general human capital as the skilled worker wage will be 
lower than their marginal product. The more market power a firm has, i.e. the fewer firms 
where skilled employees could move to, the more likely firms are, ceteris paribus, to invest 
in training. Smits (2007) shows that, firms would only prefer to convey occupation- or 
industry-specific skills if it was not regulated otherwise. Even if workers paid for general 
skills, firms have no interest in providing workers with general training because the returns 
to industry-specific skills decrease with the share of general human capital.  
Lazear (2009) argues that skills can be de facto firm specific, even if they are technically 
general, when the combinations of these general skills are specific to firms. He terms this 
concept the “skill weights approach” as each general skill has different weights in different 
firms. One essential outcome of the skill weights approach (SWA) is that firms that use more 
idiosyncratic skill weights, i.e. a combination of skills that is very different to the average 
combination of skills in other firms, are more willing to bear training costs as they can pay 
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 Schönfeld et al. (2010) analyzed the training costs from the 50 most important occupations.  
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relatively lower wages after the training period. Lazear notes that the specificity of the skill 
combination does not necessarily mean that it is specific to one firm. It can also be related to 
industries, occupations, or specific jobs. Translated into occupation specific skills, this would 
imply that firms training in occupations in which the required skills are very idiosyncratic are 
more likely to bear training costs. Geel et al. (2011) test this hypothesis and indeed find that 
more idiosyncratic skill weights in an occupation imply higher training investments on the 
part of the firms. This mechanism is supported by the finding of Hofmann et al. (2011), who 
analyze the effect of specificity of occupations on the probability that workers change their 
occupation. In accordance with the concept of the skill weights approach, they find that the 
more specific an occupation is, the less likely it is that employees change their occupation.  
While these analyses focus on the mobility between different occupations, mobility 
within occupations to other firms is likely to be a greater threat for the training firm. The 
German labor market is very occupation specific and one can safely assume that, unless an 
unexpected change occurs, apprentices plan to stay in their occupation upon completion of 
training. Hall (2015) finds that in the first year after completion of training fewer than 4% of 
all apprentices switch to an occupation that is not related at all to the occupation in which 
they have been trained. 24% switch towards a related occupation, whereas 72 % of all 
apprentices stay in the occupation they have learned. For comparison, data from the cost-
benefit survey show that 56% of all apprentices do not leave the training firm within the first 
year upon of completion of training9. Thus, mobility of persons successfully completing 
training to other firms within an occupation is also of high importance. However, also within 
an occupation, there could be quite some variation in the production process.10 Firms may 
have apprenticeship places for the same occupation but have different specializations. An 
occupation could, for example, need two main skills, but not all firms in this occupation 
might need these two skills to the same degree. Thus, firms training apprentices in the same 
occupation could also differ with respect to the weights they give to certain skills. 
Accordingly, Lazear’s SWA can also be applied to the distribution of skill weights within an 
occupation. If firms could choose the training content freely, they would only train those 
skills that are relevant for their own production process. However, in the institutional setting 
of the German apprenticeship system, strict training curricula dictate the skills the firms 
have to provide during training. 
Therefore, Lazear’s skill weights approach does not fully match the settings of the 
German apprenticeship system. The skills, which are the main choice variables in Lazear’s 
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 Even though the variation within an occupation might be lower than the variation between occupations. 
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model, cannot be freely chosen in the case of apprenticeship training. However, in the last 
years, modernizations in training curricula have often given more freedom to training firms 
by including more choice and specialization options in the curricula, which allow the firms to 
train their apprentices in a way which is more closely related to their production process. In 
terms of the SWA, this means that firms can choose their skills more in line with what they 
would do if they could freely maximize their surplus. Creating more choice options in 
apprenticeship training also means that persons successfully completing training can apply 
their skills in fewer outside companies, which gives training firms more market power. This 
implies that firms can retain a higher share of the workers’ productivity by paying lower 
wages, which leads to an increase in the expected long term benefits of training for the 
firms. Assuming that training costs do not increase, the introduction of choice options in the 
training curriculum will therefore lead to more apprenticeship places.  
3. Theory and hypothesis 
A modernization of an occupation means that the content of its training curriculum is 
changed. In this case, the old training curriculum is replaced by a new one. A modernization 
is commenced when any of the relevant stakeholders request an adjustment of the training 
content to technological developments. Usually, the duration of such a procedure lasts 
about a year (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung 2014). In most modernizations, the structure, 
i.e. the amount of choice options in the curricula, is also adjusted to the needs of the training 
firms (Table 1 in Section 4 provides an overview of the frequency of the different types of 
curriculum modernizations). In this section, we will outline the expected effect of a 
modernization on the supply of apprenticeship places in this occupation and briefly 
elaborate on the relation between modernizations and students’ demand for 
apprenticeships.  
3.1. Supply of training places 
In our analyses, we will differentiate between the effect of a modernization as such, in 
the sense of an adjustment of the training content, and the effect of a change in the number 
of choice options training firms have. Firstly, we outline the hypothesis on changes of the 
content of the curricula irrespective of the degree of differentiation. Secondly, we discuss 
the effect of having more or fewer choice options. We argue that a more specific training 
curriculum will increase the productivity of the graduates and enable the firm to pay a 
relatively lower wage.  
3.1.1 Effect of changing the content of training curricula 
A modernization of the content of the curriculum always implies an adaption of the 
training curricula to technological developments. Therefore, modernizations align more 
closely the skills learned in the training with the skills demanded in the occupation and thus 
make apprenticeship training more effective. As a result, workers who successfully complete 
  
9 
 
 
modernized apprenticeship training will ceteris paribus be more productive. If workers and 
employers equally share the returns on this additional productivity, firms have more 
incentives to train and workers are more likely to opt for a modernized occupation. As long 
as the wage increases less than graduate’s productivity11, the return for the training firms 
increases. This will induce them to offer more training places. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: A modernization of the training curriculum leads to a higher supply of apprenticeship 
places in this occupation.  
 
3.1.2 Effect of more and less heterogeneity within the curriculum 
Apart from the adaption to technological development, a modernization is often 
associated with a change in the number of choice options in the curriculum. More choice 
options would then lead to more heterogeneity, while fewer choice options lead to less 
heterogeneity in the curriculum. The effect of heterogeneity on firms’ post-training benefits 
can work via two mechanisms. Firstly, the degree of heterogeneity has a positive effect on 
the productivity of apprentices who have successfully completed training. Secondly, the 
degree of heterogeneity has a positive effect on the firms’ market power. Both mechanisms 
will be outlined below.  
Effect via the productivity of apprentices successfully completing training  
In order to explain the effect of heterogeneity on the productivity of apprentices who 
have successfully completed training, we employ elements of the argumentation in Lazear’s 
skill weights approach. Similarly to Lazear’s skill weight model, we assume that (1) a firm i in 
a given occupation produces with the skills A and B, and (2) that firms employing workers 
with this occupation need different combinations of these two skills. The weight for skill A in 
firm i is denoted with λi, which ranges from 0 to 1. λi is a random variable with the density 
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 For now, it can be assumed that the rent the firm retains is a constant share of a worker’s productivity. 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) also argue that for higher training incentives it is not necessary that the share of 
a worker’s productivity that the firm retains increases. Even if the firm retains a constant share of the worker’s 
productivity as a rent, post-training benefits are higher for more productive workers as the “firm obtains a 
share of this larger pie” (p.121). Later, we will relax this assumption in the way that the share of the wage in 
relation to the productivity decreases. Then, the effect on firm-sponsored training will be even stronger.  
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function f(λi).
12 The worker’s production function in firm i depends on the worker’s skills A 
and B, and is as follows13:  
𝑌𝑖 =  ( A ∙  λ𝑖)
(1/2) + [B ∙ (1 −  λ𝑖)]
1/2 (1) 
Moreover, each firm has a maximum total training time for an apprentice, which has to 
be split between the two skills A and B. Assume that α represents the time allocation 
between skills A and B and lies between 0 and 1. Then, the time available for learning skill A 
is equal to α and the time available for skill B is equal to 1 − α. Then, the production 
function could be written as a function of the allocation of training time to the two skills:  
𝑌𝑖 =  ( α ∙  λ𝑖)
(1/2) + [(1 − α) ∙ (1 − λ𝑖)]
1/2  (2) 
The production function is designed in such a way that the worker is most productive if 
the training time for skill A (α) equals the firm’s skill requirement λ𝑖. The higher the 
difference between α and λ𝑖, the lower the worker’s productivity in firm 𝑖 will be. If firms 
could freely maximize their surplus, they would choose α equal to λ𝑖.  
However, in contrast to Lazear’s model, in German apprenticeship training time 
allocation α between the skills A and B is externally determined by the training curricula. As 
firms’ training decisions depend on the expected productivity of the trained workers, this 
setting implies that firms’ training decisions depends on the α set in the curriculum. The 
lower the difference between α and λ𝑖, the more likely it is that the firm will invest in 
training. As this is true for any individual firm, the supply of training places in a given 
occupation rise in line with lower aggregated differences between the skill requirement and 
the skills prescribed in the training curricula ∫ α −  λ𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
, where N is the total number of firms.  
In a mono-occupation, α is the same for all firms. If there are choice options in the 
training curriculum then firms can chose between several α, i.e. specialization opportunities. 
To predict the effect of a change in the heterogeneity of the training curriculum, one needs 
to know in which case total productivity is highest. This depends on the amount and type of 
the choice options α and on the distribution of the production processes of the firms 
employing trained persons in the occupation: λ𝑖. Creating more heterogeneity in the 
curriculum will have a positive effect on aggregated productivity if firms’ production 
processes are characterized by a strong specialization of skills. However, less heterogeneity 
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could also have a positive effect on aggregated productivity, if all firms training for the same 
occupation have a very homogenous production process. In such a case, specialization would 
be counterproductive.  
A modernization which implies a change in the degree of heterogeneity of the 
curriculum usually occurs because relevant stakeholders have requested this change. One 
main characteristic of the German apprenticeship system is the “consensus principle” which 
means that all relevant stakeholders involved in the apprenticeship system have to agree to 
a new training curriculum (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung 2014). Thus, we might expect 
that, when the number of choice options is changed, ∫ α −  λ𝑖
𝑁
𝑖
 is smaller after a 
modernization than before the modernization. Under this assumption, any change in the 
degree of heterogeneity would lead to an increase in training places.  
Effect via firms’ market power  
A change in the choice options in the training curriculum has additional effects on 
firms’ post-training benefits via a change in their market power in the labor market for 
skilled workers. A more specific training curriculum creates monopsony power because it 
reduces the outside options of trained workers in the labor market as graduates can apply 
their skills in fewer outside firms. A significant share of firms employing skilled workers in 
the same occupation will prefer to hire a skilled worker with the reversed skill combination. 
Outside employers can observe the chosen specialization either on the apprenticeship 
leaving certificate, the work certificate, or the school certificate. Therefore, apprentices are 
more likely to stay in the training firm if they have been trained according to a more 
heterogeneous curriculum. This in turn increases firms’ chances to recoup training 
investments incurred.  
Moreover, firms are able to pay a lower wage relative to skilled workers’ productivity. 
Let us assume that, in line with Lazear’s argumentation, the wage the training firm has to 
pay after the training period is determined by a Nash bargaining process. Then, the wage lies 
exactly between the productivity of the graduates in the firm where they had been trained 
and their expected outside options. As the expected value of the outside options decreases 
in line with more heterogeneity in the curricula, the training firm is able to pay a lower wage. 
This increases the potential return obtained from offering training, which will lead to an 
increase in training places.  
Both because of the higher productivity of trained workers in the training firm and the 
stronger bargaining power of the firm, more possibilities to specialize in the training 
curriculum will lead to higher returns for the firm after the training period. Therefore, we 
derive the following hypothesis.  
  
12 
 
 
H2: More heterogeneity in the training curriculum increases the supply of apprenticeship 
places in this occupation. 
With regard to the effect of less heterogeneity, we outlined two opposing effects. On 
the one hand, assuming that a change in the number of choice options leads to a better fit 
between acquired and demanded skills, less heterogeneity increases workers’ productivity in 
the training firm.14. This would for example be the case if firms preferred to convey all skills 
to an equal degree and not to specialize in one skill. On the other hand, less heterogeneity 
will also decrease the bargaining power of the firm, something which leads to higher wages 
for trained workers. Accordingly, the general positive effect on the supply of a change in the 
degree of choice options would (partially) be compensated by lower relative wages and 
higher quit rates. It is not straightforward to see which of these two mechanisms has a 
stronger effect in practice. Therefore, no clear hypothesis on the effect of less heterogeneity 
can be derived.  
 
3.2 Demand for training places 
Equivalent to hypothesis 1, a modernization irrespective of the number of choice 
options is expected to have a positive effect on students’ demand for apprenticeship places 
as trained apprentices will become more productive when the curriculum becomes more up 
to date. If the training fits better to the production process of the firm, apprentices will be 
more productive after completion of training, something which could increase skilled 
workers’ wages in the firm providing training. This higher wage would make apprenticeship 
training in recently modernized occupations more attractive. Thus, we can derive the 
following hypothesis.  
H3: A modernization of the training curriculum leads to a higher demand for apprenticeship 
places in this occupation.  
 
A modernization which leads to more heterogeneity in the curriculum might have two 
opposing effects on students’ demand for training places. On the one hand, more 
heterogeneity will lead to a better fit between the production process and the training 
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content which will make trained persons more productive and will therefore increase their 
wage in the training firm. On the other hand, apprenticeship graduates will then also 
become more specialized and more dependent on the training firm. This would ceteris 
paribus reduce their outside options and the wage they can earn in another firm.15 In case of 
a layoff, the apprentice would be more likely to suffer a wage loss. Therefore, more 
heterogeneity in the curriculum will reduce the graduates’ bargaining power and their wage 
in the training firm. This makes an apprenticeship in occupations with a more heterogeneous 
curriculum less attractive.  
The effect of more heterogeneity in the training curricula on the demand for 
apprenticeship places could therefore go in different directions, and we cannot derive a 
clear hypothesis. Nonetheless, even though theoretically the effect of heterogeneity in the 
training curricula on the demand for apprenticeship is not clear, we will assess this 
relationship empirically. With respect to the effect of a modernization leading to less 
heterogeneity on students’ demand for apprenticeship places, both mechanisms could work 
in the same direction. If the lower number of choice options leads to a better fit between 
acquired and demanded skills, less heterogeneity will increase workers’ productivity in the 
training firm. Moreover, less heterogeneity in the curriculum will improve graduates’ 
bargaining power as they will then have more outside options. Therefore, we derive the 
following hypothesis.  
H4: Less heterogeneity in the training curriculum increases the demand for apprenticeship 
places in this occupation. 
 
4. Data  
4.1 Supply of and demand for apprenticeship places 
The data used for this analysis is based on the survey of New Training Contracts with 
the effective date of 30th of Sept of each training year.16 It includes information about the 
number of new training contracts and the supply of and demand for training contracts. The 
new training contracts are collated by the Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung (BIBB) from the 
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 In this way more heterogeneity would lead to a lower outflow of trained graduates to other firms. 
Unfortunately, there is no data on the outflow of apprentices successfully completing training to other firms at 
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16 
For information about the survey see: http://www.bibb.de/dokumente/pdf/naa309_BIBB-
Erhebung_Zusammenfassung_201103.pdf  
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responsible chambers, which have information on all new training contracts in their 
associated occupations. The supply of training contracts is calculated by adding the new 
training contracts of each year to the number of unfilled training places the firms report to 
the German Federal Employment Agency. The demand of apprenticeship places is obtained 
by adding the new training contracts to the number of applicants who could not get an 
apprenticeship place and did not have any other alternative.17 Thus, our database is a full 
census of the complete supply of and demand for apprenticeship places in Germany. 
Information about the supply of and demand for training contracts at the occupational level 
has been available since 2004.  
The data set comprises information on the supply of and the demand for all 330 
occupations that were recognized18 in 2014.19 We had to gather information on the 
development of all occupations in order to construct a dataset with comparable occupations 
over time.20 When an occupation had a different name in the past or results from a merge of 
different occupations, it is linked to its predecessor(s)21. In the event that the occupation has 
had several predecessors, we use the sum of the supply (or demand) of training places of 
those predecessors and match this sum to the new occupation.22 
We exclude very small occupations when the occupation comprised less than twelve 
apprentices in any of the years between 2004 and 2014. Moreover, we excluded eight 
occupations, which could not be compared over time due to a complex restructuring in the 
course of a modernization.23 In this way, we obtain a panel data set of 265 different 
occupations over eleven years. 244 occupations existed during the whole time period from 
2004 to 2014, other were introduced at a later stage and therefore existed only during part 
of this period.  
                                                 
 
 
17 
The old definition of demand is used, to be able to compare the data between the years.  
18
 All training regulations are published under the Federal Law Gazette (“Bundesgesetzblatt”). 
19
 This also excludes the possibility that occupations that were abandoned are still in the dataset.  
20 It is important that occupations which were modernized are comparable before and after the modernization. 
In some cases, occupations were split, which does not allow for a comparison over time. Those occupations 
were not part of the analysis. 
21
 In our analyses we control for possible effects of a name change or mergers by including a name dummy as 
well as a dummy for mergers.  
22
 As the data of the new training contracts are gathered by the chambers of industry and commerce and the 
chambers of craft, which sometimes incorrectly report the old name of the occupation, occupations that were 
not modernized in our research period also had to be matched to their predecessors.  
23
 This is the case when occupations were split and the split parts were merged with other occupations.  
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4.2 Curriculum heterogeneity 
4.2.1 Structure of the curricula 
We base the categorization of the degree of heterogeneity in the curricula on the 
structure of the training, which is defined for each occupation in the training regulation (see 
(Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung 2014)24. Mono-occupations are occupations without any 
specialization. Thus, the training content is identical for all firms training the same 
occupation. On the other hand, there are also occupations whose curricula allow for internal 
differentiation. Then firms can chose between training courses with special training content 
for different fields of activity. For example, in some occupations firms have to choose 
different fields of application. Even though the concrete competencies that have to be 
taught are the same, they can be imparted in different fields. In other occupations, firms can 
chose priority topics, which take company characteristics into consideration and account for 
not more than 6 months out of the entire training period25. Even more differentiation is 
possible in occupations with different disciplines. A discipline is a specialization that has to 
be taken in the third training year and is also tested in the final exam in contrast to the 
priority topics. The highest degree of differentiation within an occupation is obtained by the 
use of elective qualification units. Usually several out of many possible units have to be 
chosen, which leads to a high number of different possible combinations within one 
occupation. In these occupations, firms have most possibilities to adapt the training content 
to their specific skill requirements. However, elective qualification units vary in the time they 
constitute of the total training time. In some occupations, they only account for half a 
training year, while in other occupations they account for a full training year. Bretschneider 
& Schwarz (2011) provide a graphical overview of the different structures of training 
curricula (see Figure A1).  
We ranked the five different training structures according to their degree of 
differentiation. Doing so, we take into account the number of specializations and the time 
these specializations take in relation to the total training time. The structure with elective 
qualification units, for example, allows for the highest number of possible combinations as 
firms can choose several out of many possible qualification units (see Figure A1 in the 
appendix). In contrast, a structure including different disciplines means that firms can chose 
one discipline out of usually three or four disciplines. Therefore, the disciplines are mostly 
ranked lower than the qualification units. However, the internal differentiation is not only 
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 In the following, we use the terminology that is also employed in the English version of the official BIBB 
leaflet about training regulation (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung 2014).  
25
 The entire training period can last between 2 and 3 ½ years.  
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determined by the number of specializations but also by the importance these 
specializations have in relation to the total training content. For example, when a firm can 
chose between 100 specializations, but these specializations are only supposed to last for 
one week, they are likely to be not very relevant for the skill acquisition of the apprentice. 
Therefore, we also take into account the time these specializations take in relation to the 
total training time. As a result, when the elective qualification units account only for a 
relatively short time period (e.g. only half a year), they are ranked lower than the disciplines. 
According to the number and relevance of choice options, we yield the following ranking on 
the degree of heterogeneity for the different curricula structures from less to more 
heterogeneous: mono-occupations, fields of application, priority topics, elective qualification 
units (half a year) disciplines, and elective qualification units (full year).  
 
4.2.2 Defining the change in heterogeneity 
The amount of choice options, i.e. degree of heterogeneity, can only be changed in the 
course of a modernization. The operationalization of a modernization is straightforward as 
the result of a modernization is always the replacement of an old training curriculum by a 
new one. We allocated all modernizations into three groups: (1) modernizations creating less 
choice options in the curriculum, (2) modernizations that do not affect the choice options 
and (3) modernizations that allow for more curriculum heterogeneity.  
In principle, changes in the degree of differentiation within an occupation can occur in 
four ways. Firstly, a curriculum could be given a different structure. For example, a change 
from e.g. a mono-occupation to an occupation with disciplines is defined as a change 
towards more heterogeneity. Secondly, the amount of possible specialization options can 
change within a given structure of the curriculum (e.g. a firm can chose between two instead 
of three possible disciplines). Thirdly, the time spend on existing specializations in the 
curriculum can change (elective qualification units should last one year instead of only half a 
year). Fourthly, when several occupations are merged into one occupation, the 
modernization is coded as less heterogeneity.26 Table A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix show 
the training structures and their respective number of choice options before and after the 
modernizations in the time period analyzed.  
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 We also included a separate dummy on mergers to test for potential separate effect of merged occupations. 
Splits of occupations are not part of our database.  
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Table 1 provides an overview of how those modernizations in the different years are 
coded. In the period from the years 2005 to 2014, 103 modernizations were implemented, 
whereas 6 occupations were modernized twice.27 Thus, in these years 97 occupations were 
modernized. For our analysis, we can make use of 86 different modernizations. 8 
modernizations had to be excluded because they led to a split and a merge of several 
occupations at the same time, something which impedes a comparison between the pre- 
and post-treatment period28, and 9 modernizations were excluded because they affected 
very small occupations with fewer than 12 apprentices. From the 86 modernized 
occupations, 22 became more homogenous, 26 became more heterogeneous and 38 did not 
change their structure at all. As can be seen in Table 1, in each year at least two 
modernizations occurred, with peaks in the years 2005, 2006 and 2013.  
The information about the modernizations is obtained from the BIBB database on 
occupations and their modernizations, which is available online29. New training regulations 
always come into force in the month of August in the respective year. As the new training 
year always starts in September, all new training contracts reported in this year have to 
abide by the valid curricula of the respective year. For example, when the occupation “plant 
mechanic” is modernized in 2004, all firms concluding and reporting a new training contract 
for training the “plant mechanic” in 2004 have to train according to the new regulation.   
 
  
                                                 
 
 
27
 For occupations that were modernized in 2004, we cannot compare a pre- and post-modernization period.  
28
 A detailed description of the unambiguous modernization is available upon request.  
29
 https://www.bibb.de/de/berufeinfo.php/new_modernised_occupations_by_year  
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Table 1: Curriculum modernizations between 2005 and 2014 
Year Modernizations 
Less 
heterogeneity 
No change in 
heterogeneity 
More 
heterogeneity 
2005 15 6  (3) 6 3 
2006 16 4  (2) 7 5 
2007 6 1  (1) 4 1 
2008 2 1  (0) 0 1 
2009 6 1  (1) 1 4 
2010 8 1  (0) 5 2 
2011 9 1  (0) 2 6 
2012 5 0  (0) 3 2 
2013 12 4  (3) 6 2 
2014 7 3  (1) 4 0 
Total 86 22 (11) 38 26 
Note: The number of merged occupations leading to less heterogeneity is displayed in parentheses in 
the third column. Modernized occupations that were split cannot be compared over time. These 
occupations are not included in the analysis. Moreover, curriculum modernizations for very small 
occupations (with fewer than 12 apprentices) are also not included.  
 
 
 
5. Empirical strategy 
We first estimate occupational fixed-effect regressions in which we relate the supply of 
training places to the modernizations in the training curricula. To test the effect of changes 
in the degree of heterogeneity, we include two interaction terms indicating whether the 
modernization introduced more or less heterogeneity in the training curriculum. The 
occupational fixed-effect regression is therefore specified as follows:  
𝑆𝑜𝑡 =   𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜 +  𝛽1 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑡   +  𝛽2 ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡 + 𝛽2 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡  + 𝛿𝑡𝑑𝑡 +  𝛾𝑜𝑡𝑜  +  𝜀𝑜𝑡 (3) 
𝑆𝑜𝑡 denotes the supply of apprenticeship places in year 𝑡 and occupation 𝑜. The 
indicator variable 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜 denotes the dummies for the different occupation. The variable 
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑡 is 1 if an occupation is modernized and 0 if it is not yet or has never been 
modernized. Thus, the parameter β1 estimates the effect of the modernization itself. Six 
occupations were modernized twice in the time period analyzed. For these occupations, we 
used a second modernization dummy (not displayed in equation 3). To measure the effect of 
changes in curriculum heterogeneity, we include interaction terms indicating modernizations 
that allow for more heterogeneity (ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡) and modernizations that lead to less 
heterogeneity, i.e. more homogeneity (ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡). If the modernization implied a change 
towards more heterogeneity, ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡 takes the value 1 in the years after the modernization 
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and 0 in the years before the modernization. When there was no change in the structure of 
the curriculum or when the number of choice options was reduced, the variable ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡 is 
always equal to 0. The values for ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡 are analogous. Thus, β1 and β2 estimate the effect 
of more or less heterogeneity respectively. As controls, the following variables are included: 
year dummies 𝑑𝑡 and occupation-specific time trends 𝑡𝑜. By the inclusion of the year 
dummies, we can exclude year specific exogenous shocks affecting the supply of 
apprenticeship places, such as cohort-specific demographic changes, changes in the number 
of school leavers and business cycle effects. The occupation-specific time trends control for 
any occupation specific upwards or downwards trend in the number of apprenticeships.  
Analogously, we also run a regression in which we analyze to what extent more or less 
heterogeneity in the curriculum introduced by the modernization affects students’ demand 
for apprenticeship places:  
𝐷𝑜𝑡 =   𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜 +  𝛽1 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑡   +  𝛽2 ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡 + 𝛽2 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡  +  𝛿𝑡𝑑𝑡 +  𝛾𝑜𝑡𝑜 + 𝛽3𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑡  + 𝜀𝑜𝑡 (4) 
This regression includes the same variables of interest and control variables as the 
training supply regressions. Moreover, we include an additional control variable 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑡 
which indicates whether or not the name of the occupation has been changed during the 
modernization. Correspondingly, 𝛽3 estimates the effect of a name change. This variable 
measures potential changes in the attractiveness of the name of the occupation. Krewerth et 
al. (2004) show that the name of the occupation has a significant effect on the occupational 
choice of young school leavers. If policy makers choose a more attractive name, a name 
change might be associated with an increase in students’ demand for apprenticeships.  
 
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive results 
First, we present some descriptive results on the relation between the modernizations 
and the supply of and demand for training places. Figure 1 shows average supply of and 
demand for training places over all occupations and years before and after the 
modernization differentiated by the three change categories: less heterogeneity, no change 
in the degree of heterogeneity and more heterogeneity. The values in the figure are based 
on the 86 modernizations in our period of analysis (See Table 1). Note that for each 
modernization the numbers of years before and after the modernization are different. For 
example, from the 22 occupations that became less heterogeneous after the modernization, 
6 occupations were modernized in the year 2005 with only one observed pre-treatment year 
and 8 post treatment years. Similarly, for occupations that were modernized in the year 
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2014, only one post-treatment year can be observed. Accordingly, the modernization of the 
years in between imply more or fewer pre- and post-treatment years respectively.  
Figure 1 shows that a lower degree of heterogeneity is associated to an extreme 
decrease in both the supply of and demand for training places. However, this large decrease 
is particularly due to two very large occupations. Conversely, when the structure of the 
curriculum becomes more heterogeneous, supply of and demand for training places increase 
by 73% and 56%, respectively. Also, when the curriculum structure does not change, both 
supply and demand show an increase after the modernization. These outcomes suggest that 
both firms and apprentices prefer more heterogeneity in the training regulation and dislike 
less heterogeneity.30  
Figure 1: Demand for and supply of training places before and after the modernization 
 
Note: The numbers refer to the average supply and demand over occupations as well as over the years before 
and after the modernization (het. = heterogeneity). Source: Demand and supply of training places in Germany. 
For this graphic, only the first modernizations are considered.  
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 This is in accordance with other findings that there are strong interdependencies between supply of and 
demand for apprenticeship places (Maier & Walden 2014; Behringer & Ulrich 1997).  
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6.2 Regression results 
Table 2 shows the estimation results of the occupation fixed-effect regression on the 
supply of and demand for apprenticeships respectively. As six occupations were modernized 
twice in the respective time period, we include a control dummy for the second 
modernization and interaction terms indicating whether or not the second modernization 
was associated with more (or less) heterogeneity.  
The estimation results show that most of the time curriculum modernizations as such 
are not significantly associated with the supply of training places. Nonetheless, as the data 
source is a full census, the non-significant coefficients can also be interpreted 
meaningfully.31 The coefficient suggests that modernizations are slightly positively 
associated to firms’ supply of training places. Considering the first modernizations, which 
make up 93% of all modernizations, a modernization as such is associated to an increase of 
the supply of 56 training places, which corresponds to 2.5% of the average supply of training 
places.32 In contrast, the six second modernizations even had a negative effect on the supply 
of training places with a coefficient of -183.  
Including the interaction variables on whether the modernizations were associated 
with more or less heterogeneity decreases the coefficient for the first modernizations and 
renders the coefficient for the second modernizations even more negative and significant at 
the five percent level. The coefficient for modernizations creating more heterogeneity is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. This is true for both the first modernization and also 
for the six second modernizations, whereas the coefficient of 1.057 for the second 
modernizations is much higher than the coefficient of 318 for the remaining 80 
modernizations. However, considering the average supply of training places of 2,215, even 
the coefficient for the first modernization implies a substantial increase of 14%. This shows 
that modernizations of the curriculum only successfully increase the supply of training places 
if firms receive more opportunities to adapt the curriculum to their needs. These results 
confirm hypotheses 2 and reject hypothesis 1. These results also support the theory that the 
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 Usually the significance levels indicate the probability that this estimate is true in the population. In this case 
we have administrative data from the whole population, i.e. supply of new training contracts. For a description 
of the dataset please see (Flemming & Granath 2011).  
32
 The average supply of training places is 2,215.  
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effect is indeed channeled via the firm’s post training benefits and not via the training costs. 
Training could become less costly after any modernization, but it is only the heterogeneity 
which leads to an increased wedge between productivity and wages.  
The estimation results also show that modernizations that reduce the heterogeneity in 
the curriculum decrease the supply of training places by 209, which is a decrease of 9%. We 
also test for a separate effect of merged occupations by including a variable indicating 
whether the modernization consisted of a merger of occupations (column 3). The results 
show that the negative effect of less heterogeneity is mainly due to modernizations that 
combined several occupations into one. Including this control variable, the coefficient for 
less heterogeneity increases and the coefficient for the merge of occupation is -336 and 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficient, however, is much lower than what was 
suggested by the descriptive analysis in Figure 1. This is probably due to the fact that 
occupations are often merged when they are on a downward trend anyway. As we control 
for occupation specific time trends in the regression analysis, the coefficient is lower than 
descriptive results suggest.  
Table 2 also shows the estimation results on students’ demand for training places 
(columns 4 to 6). These results seem to be rather similar.33 Students are more likely to apply 
for occupations that provide more heterogeneity in the training curriculum as the coefficient 
for more heterogeneity in the curricula is positive (205) and significant. Also the coefficient 
for the six second modernizations creating more heterogeneity is positive and significant at 
the 1 percent level. When comparing these results to the estimation results for the supply of 
apprenticeship places, one can see that the former coefficients are slightly smaller (at least 
for the first modernizations). This suggests that students’ demand for apprenticeships is less 
sensitive to having more heterogeneity in the curriculum than the firm’s supply.  
Again, the modernization as such has an insignificant effect on the demand of training 
places. Moreover, modernizations which lead to more homogeneous curricula are not 
significantly related to the demand for apprenticeship places. Thus, we have to reject 
hypotheses 3 and 4. The positive coefficient of more heterogeneity could suggest that more 
choice options always enhance the graduates’ productivity.  
                                                 
 
 
33 It is indeed not very surprising that the estimation results on supply and demand are closely related. Excess 
supply or demand is usually not large as the majority of all firms that supply apprenticeships also find 
apprentices and most students who would like to have an apprenticeship find one. When we regress the 
number of new apprenticeship contracts (i.e., matched supply and demand) on the same explanatory variables, 
the estimation results are indeed very similar.  
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Table 2: Supply of and demand for apprenticeship places (occupation fixed-effects regressions) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Supply Supply Supply Demand Demand Demand 
Modernized (before/after) 55.68 15.55 15.48 41.49 -0.94 8.06 
 (1.32) (0.25) (0.25) (0.83) (-0.01) (0.12) 
More heterogeneity  317.83
**
 318.62
**
  205.47
*
 204.75
*
 
  (3.23) (3.24)  (2.26) (2.25) 
Less heterogeneity  -209.41
*
 -38.24  -57.68 3.22 
  (-2.01) (-0.28)  (-0.59) (0.03) 
Merge of occupations   -335.53
*
   -125.60 
   (-2.00)   (-0.77) 
Modernized (before/after) (2. Modernization) -183.20 -794.78
**
 -794.82
**
 -922.74
***
 -1444.62
***
 -1446.49
***
 
 (-1.06) (-2.81) (-2.81) (-4.50) (-5.54) (-5.54) 
More heterogeneity (2. Modernization)  1057.13
**
 1085.89
**
  1461.85
***
 1458.16
***
 
  (2.76) (2.83)  (3.49) (3.49) 
Less heterogeneity (2. Modernization)  939.88 939.96  1162.70 1137.38 
  (1.92) (1.92)  (1.77) (1.73) 
Year dummies (Reference 2004)       
       
2005 -9.96 -11.74 -11.16 -10.74 -12.73 -12.47 
 (-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.03) 
2006 174.52 166.77 167.95 206.30 200.34 201.06 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
2007 459.99 446.22 448.07 428.52 419.04 419.93 
 (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) 
2008 499.61 480.16 482.01 403.31 390.05 390.84 
 (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
2009 377.82 351.77 354.91 306.61 289.63 290.85 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
2010 459.92 425.66 429.47 375.65 355.32 356.67 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
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2011 613.44 567.84 571.55 497.88 471.10 472.30 
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
2012 642.75 589.26 593.53 541.10 507.02 508.37 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) 
2013 642.71 586.20 592.36 569.85 533.42 535.28 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
2014 710.71 654.20 660.36 637.85 601.42 603.28 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Name change    -49.17 -50.39 -70.04 
    (-0.63) (-0.64) (-0.84) 
Name change (2. Modernization)    1219.16
***
 397.90 421.79 
    (3.74) (0.83) (0.88) 
Constant 166445.89 155262.24 156608.42 186269.15 179077.74 179463.72 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
Occupation-specific year trends yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Occupation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of occupations 265 265 265 265 265 265 
Observations 2843 2843 2843 2843 2843 2843 
R2 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.79 0.80 0.80 
 Note: T-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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6.3 Robustness test 
Only a temporary effect? 
In order to test whether the effect of the modernization is particularly large in the first 
year after the modernization and levels off in the following years, we created a variable 
which is one for the immediate year after the modernization and zero in all other years. We 
further created two variables indicating the interaction between the first year after the 
modernization and the change towards more or less heterogeneity. The variables are again 1 
for the year immediately after the modernization that leads to more (or less) heterogeneity 
and zero in all other years. We estimated the two baseline regressions for supply and 
demand (shown again in column 1 and 4 of Table 3), respectively34, including these control 
variables (see columns 2 and 5 of Table 3). The estimation results show that the first year 
after the modernization does not have any significant effect on firms’ supply of or students’ 
demand for apprenticeship places. Moreover, in both the supply and demand regressions, 
the estimation results on the effects of modernization remain robust showing that more 
heterogeneity in the curriculum increases both supply and demand for apprenticeship 
places.  
Anticipation effect before the modernization 
The increase in supply and demand after modernizations that increase curriculum 
heterogeneity could also be due to a dip in the supply and/or demand in the year before the 
modernization, if firms and students anticipated the modernization and postponed the 
training to the next year when the modernized curriculum was introduced. To test whether 
this could be a driver of the effects of the modernization, we also added a dummy variable 
for the year immediately before the modernization to the baseline regression. Again, we 
also construct interaction terms, which differentiate between modernizations creating more 
and less heterogeneity. The estimation results presented in Table 3 (column 3 and 6) show 
that the coefficients for modernization creating more heterogeneity even become larger, 
whereas the coefficients of the dummy variable for the last year before the modernization 
with more heterogeneity are also significantly positive. This suggests that firms already tend 
to increase their supply of apprenticeships one year before the modernization anticipating 
that the training curricula will be modernized and more choice options will be introduced.  
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 If we take the regression in column 3 and 6 of Table 2 as baseline regressions, including these control 
variables has similar effects. 
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Table 3: Supply and demand for apprenticeship places (occupation fixed-effects regressions controlling for anticipation and short-term effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Supply Supply Supply Demand Demand Demand 
Modernized (before/after) 15.55 21.00 -0.16 -1.09 -26.52 -61.47 
 (0.25) (0.29) (-0.00) (-0.02) (-0.35) (-0.69) 
More heterogeneity 317.83
**
 322.40
**
 646.90
***
 209.72
*
 209.49
*
 537.94
***
 
 (3.23) (2.80) (4.56) (2.31) (1.97) (4.11) 
Less heterogeneity -209.41
*
 -225.64 -275.84 -61.32 -46.25 51.29 
 (-2.01) (-1.81) (-1.79) (-0.63) (-0.40) (0.36) 
Modernized (before/after) (2. Modernization) -794.78
**
 -796.32
**
 -742.99
**
 -1443.87
***
 -1439.88
***
 -1389.40
***
 
 (-2.81) (-2.81) (-2.63) (-5.53) (-5.51) (-5.34) 
More heterogeneity (2. Modernization) 1057.13
**
 1058.78
**
 1046.41
**
 1647.41
***
 1631.73
***
 1613.30
***
 
 (2.76) (2.75) (2.73) (4.66) (4.60) (4.57) 
Less heterogeneity (2. Modernization) 939.88 944.61 898.21 1559.68
***
 1541.68
***
 1499.63
***
 
 (1.92) (1.92) (1.84) (3.45) (3.41) (3.33) 
First year after modernization  -10.16 -6.19  47.19 54.07 
  (-0.14) (-0.08)  (0.70) (0.80) 
First after modernization with more heterogeneity  -9.05 -80.90  1.57 -71.08 
  (-0.08) (-0.72)  (0.02) (-0.68) 
First after modernization with less heterogeneity  29.31 34.48  -28.64 -45.85 
  (0.24) (0.28)  (-0.25) (-0.40) 
Last year before modernization   -30.50   -53.47 
   (-0.39)   (-0.75) 
Last year before modernization with more 
heterogeneity 
  459.38
***
   466.84
***
 
   (3.79)   (4.17) 
Last year before modernization with less heterogeneity   -73.59   142.31 
   (-0.55)   (1.15) 
Name change    -50.01 -50.08 -53.39 
    (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.68) 
Constant 155262.24 155514.18 157810.58 179003.32 176230.71 177376.47 
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 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
Occupation-specific year trends yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Occupation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of occupations 265 265 265 265 265 265 
Observations 2843 2843 2843 2843 2843 2843 
R2 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the effect of heterogeneity within training curricula on the 
supply of and demand for apprenticeship training places. We make use of the 
modernizations of training curricula to find the effect of creating more or less heterogeneity 
in the contents of a training curriculum. We find that more heterogeneity in a training 
curriculum increases both supply and demand for training places in the occupation.  
Modernizations of training curricula are a relatively exogenous change of the 
institutional training framework. However, one might argue that choice options could be 
introduced in the same year of other unobserved changes that might affect the supply or 
demand for apprenticeship places. Such changes could refer to the business cycle or the 
demographic situation. However, by including year dummies and occupation-specific time 
trends, we can rule out a substantial amount of potential endogeneity. Moreover, the exact 
year of the modernized regulation can be seen as relatively random as occupations are not 
regularly modernized.  
Our estimation results show that introducing more heterogeneity in a training 
curriculum increases the number of apprenticeship places offered by firms as well as 
students’ demand for these places. This suggests that having a curriculum that fits more 
closely to the requirements of a firm’s production process is necessary to ensure the 
attractiveness of the dual system both for the firm and the apprentice. A modernization, 
which improves the match between the content of the curriculum and firms’ training needs, 
makes apprenticeship training more effective and graduated apprentices more productive. 
As the production processes of firms are often quite diverse, it is recommendable to allow 
for sufficient choice options in the training curriculum when a modernization is 
implemented. Firms are willing to offer more training places when they can expect higher 
post-training benefits from their apprentices. Moreover, more specific curricula also increase 
the market power of firms, something which enables them to pay wages that are below 
workers’ productivity.  
However, we find that the beneficial effect of more heterogeneity in the training 
curricula for the firms does not lead to a decrease in potential students’ demand for 
apprenticeships. Instead, we find that a more heterogeneous curriculum also increases 
students’ demand for apprenticeship places. This might be explained by a positive net effect 
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of heterogeneity on skilled worker wages when they acquire more skills that they can apply 
in their job instead of skills they could not use in the firm where they are employed.35  
While a sufficient number of choice options is important for the attractiveness of a 
curriculum for both firms and apprentices, it might also be important to ensure a certain 
standardization, because too much heterogeneity will give graduated apprentices very few 
chances outside their training firm. Also for firms, some standardization of the contents of 
the training curriculum could have positive effects. When firms search for workers on the 
external labor market, they will benefit from a higher number of apprenticeship graduates 
that could potentially work in their firm. In contrast, having too much heterogeneity would 
restrict the possibilities to recruit skilled workers from other firms. The number of suitable 
skilled workers would then fully depend on the firm’s own engagement in apprenticeship 
training. Our findings show that the modernizations that increased heterogeneity in the 
curricula of apprenticeship training in Germany retained sufficient standardization to 
prevent these potential adverse effects.   
  
                                                 
 
 
35
 The available data does not allow us to estimate the effect of heterogeneity on skilled worker wages. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Modernizations leading to less heterogeneity 
 
 Number and type of choice options  
Year Before modernization After modernization Merger 
2005 
Disciplines (1 out of 3) Priority topics (1 out of 3) No 
2 Disciplines  Mono-occupation No 
12 predecessor occupations  Yes 
2 predecessor occupations  Yes 
3 predecessor occupations Disciplines Yes 
Disciplines (1 out of 2) + fields of 
application (1 out of 3) 
Fields of application (1 out of 3) 
No 
2006 
Disciplines Priority topics No 
2 predecessor occupations Mono-occupation Yes 
Disciplines (1 out of 6) Disciplines (1 out of 2) No 
Priority topics (1 out of 2) Mono-occupation  No 
2 predecessor occupations Mono-occupation Yes 
2007 3 predecessor occupations Disciplines (1 out of 3) Yes 
2008 Fields of application (1 out of 4) Mono-occupation  No 
2009 Two predecessor occupations  Disciplines (1 out of 3) Yes 
2010 
Specialized fields (1 out of two) 52 Weeks Elective qualification units (2 out 
of 12) 26 Weeks No 
2011 
Elective qualification units 
 (2 out of 5) + (2 out of 8) + (1 out of 7) 
(44 weeks) 
Elective qualification units (2 out 
of 11) + (1 out of 7) (52 weeks) 
No 
Three predecessor occupations Disciplines Yes 
2012 Various predecessor occupations 4 Disciplines Yes 
2013 
 
5 Fields of application 4 Fields of application No 
Various predecessor occupations 5 Priority topics Yes 
Various predecessor occupations 3 Disciplines Yes 
2014 
3 Disciplines 2 Disciplines No 
Various predecessor occupations 2 from 10 elective qualification 
units Yes 
3 Disciplines 5 Priority topics  No 
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Table A2: Modernizations leading to more heterogeneity 
 
 
 Number and type of choice options 
Year Before modernization After modernization 
2005 
Disciplines (1 out of 3)  Elective qualification units (2 out of 6) 
Mono-occupation (3 alternatives) Mono-occupation (4 alternatives) 
Mono-occupation Discipline (1 out of five) 
2006 
Priority topics (1 out of 2) Priority topics (1 out of 3) 
Mono-occupation Elective qualification units (2 out of 5) 
Mono-occupation with elective modules (2 out 
of 3 modules) 
Discipline (1 out of 2) 
Mono-occupation Fields of application (1 out of 10) 
Mono-occupation with 4 Priority topics Mono-occupation with 6 priority topics 
2007 
Elective qualification units (1 out of 4) + (4 out 
of 7) 
Elective qualification units (1 out of 4) + (4 out of 
8) 
2008 
Mono-occupation  Elective qualification units (1 out of 5) 
Mono-occupation  Priority topics (1 out of 3) 
2009 
Mono-occupation Discipline (1 out of 2) 
Mono-occupation Priority topics (1 out of 4)  
Discipline (1 out of 3) Elective qualification units (1 out of 6) 
Mono-occupation Elective qualification units 
2010 
Priority topics (1 out of 3)  Priority topics (1 out of 4) 
Priority topics (1 out of 4) Discipline (1 out of 5) 
2011 
Mono-occupation Specialized fields (1 out of 2) 
Discipline (1out of 3) Elective qualification units (2 out of 9) + (1 out of 
2) 
Priority topics Elective qualification units (1 out of 3)  
Discipline Elective qualification units 
Elective qualification units (2 out of 8) Elective qualification units (2 out of 4) + (2 out of 
6) 
Fields of application (1 out of 3) Elective qualification units (1 out of 3)  
2012 
Mono-occupation Priority topics (1 out of 2) 
Priority topics (1 out of 6) Disciplines (1 out of 7 ) 
2013 
Mono-occupation Priority topics (1 out of 3) 
Mono-occupation Fields of application (1 out of 7) 
Mono-occupation Disciplines (1 out 4) 
2014 Mono-occupation Disciplines (1 out of 2) 
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Figure A1: Structures of the curricula 
 
 
Note: Translated from Bretschneider & Schwarz (2011) 
 
 
 
 
